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Abstract
Emotional and social information can sway otherwise rational decisions. For example, when participants decide between
two faces that are probabilistically rewarded, they make biased choices that favor smiling relative to angry faces. This bias
may arise because facial expressions evoke positive and negative emotional responses, which in turn may motivate social
approach and avoidance. We tested a wide range of pictures that evoke emotions or convey social information, including
animals, words, foods, a variety of scenes, and faces differing in trustworthiness or attractiveness, but we found only facial
expressions biased decisions. Our results extend brain imaging and pharmacological findings, which suggest that a brain
mechanism supporting social interaction may be involved. Facial expressions appear to exert special influence over this
social interaction mechanism, one capable of biasing otherwise rational choices. These results illustrate that only specific
types of emotional experiences can best sway our choices.
Citation: Furl N, Gallagher S, Averbeck BB (2012) A Selective Emotional Decision-Making Bias Elicited by Facial Expressions. PLoS ONE 7(3): e33461. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0033461
Editor: Angela Sirigu, French National Centre for Scientific Research, France
Received September 1, 2011; Accepted February 15, 2012; Published March 15, 2012
This is an open-access article, free of all copyright, and may be freely reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, built upon, or otherwise used by anyone for
any lawful purpose. The work is made available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication.
Funding: This work was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Mental Health. The funders had
no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: nick.furl@mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk
Introduction
Visual scenes such as smiling and attractive faces, appetizing
foods and beautiful or horrific pictures can evoke strong emotions.
People routinely employ such emotional imagery in the media and
even during ordinary social interactions to attempt to bias the
decisions of others. Although decision making is subject to bias [1],
psychology and economics research has classically relied on an
assumption that decisions are based on an optimal, unbiased
assessment of evidence. This assumption is embodied, for example,
by models of instrumental learning. In instrumental learning tasks,
an agent learns which choices predict reward or punishment based
on feedback from previous choices. Reinforcement learning
models [2] can explain instrumental choices by predicting how a
rational agent or ‘‘ideal observer’’, who is not subject to any
emotional biases, should evaluate the evidence to make choices
that maximize rewards.
Reinforcement learning models are also popular in neurosci-
ence because they describe some of the brain’s mechanisms that
may control instrumental learning [3]. Reinforcement learning
models compute reward prediction errors from choice feedback
and these errors can accurately predict neural responses in the
mesostriatal dopamine ‘‘reward system’’ [4–6] and its targets
including the ventral striatum [6,7]. Thus, these reward-related
areas appear to contribute to feedback-based learning, and
evidence suggests they implement a mechanism akin to that of
reinforcement learning models.
While the reward system may contribute to rational decisions
about monetary rewards, different brain mechanisms may
contribute when decisions are biased by emotional or social
information. Averbeck & Duchaine [8] devised an instrumental
learning task that required choosing between images of a smiling
or angry expression, where the two images were respectively
associated with a 0.60 and a 0.40 chance of winning £0.10.
Although participants were instructed to maximize their win-
nings, they were biased to choose the smiling face over the angry
face, given equivalent feedback. This was in contrast to a
reinforcement learning model which showed no bias. Evans,
Fleming, Dolan & Averbeck [9] examined the instrumental
learning task using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI). As predicted by reinforcement learning models, reward
prediction errors to monetary feedback were indeed associated
with responses in the ventral striatum. However, the expression
bias was correlated instead with responses in temporoparietal
junction, a component of the putative ‘‘mentalizing network’’,
responsible for understanding the thoughts and intentions of
others [10–12]. The possibility that social interaction mechanisms
mediate the bias is in line with findings that angry facial
expressions facilitate social avoidance-related behavior [13].
Moreover, in a further study, the size of the bias was modulated
by oxytocin [14], a neuropeptide known to increase social
approach behavior and enhance face expression recognition [15–
19].
This brain imaging and pharmacological data suggest involve-
ment of a mechanism related to social interaction. Nevertheless, it
is possible that the biases are due to their positive and negative
emotional valence and not the specifically social component. In
this case, any stimulus pair which similarly differs in emotional
valence will recruit the same mechanisms and produce a bias. A
second untested possibility is that socially-relevant dimensions
other than emotional expressions, including attractiveness and
trustworthiness, may also bias choices in decision behavior.
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While it is possible that the bias is restricted to certain types of
stimulus information, it may also be restricted to certain kinds of
decisions. To date, this bias has been observed only for learning
based on monetary rewards. However, learning based on
monetary rewards and learning based on monetary losses
(punishments) involve neural mechanisms that differ in their
dependence on dopamine [6] and are partially distinct anatom-
ically [20–22]. Facial expressions therefore might modulate only
one of these mechanisms.
We investigated the specificity with which emotional and social
information can bias otherwise rational instrumental learning. In
the first experiment, we compared the influence of facial
expressions with that of emotionally-valenced images of animals
and food items. The second experiment employed a wider range of
non-face image pairs, including more animals and food items and
various emotional scenes and words. For the third experiment, we
measured the bias for face pairs differing in trustworthiness or
attractiveness. For the fourth experiment, we obtained emotional
valence ratings of the images used in the preceding experiments for
correlations with bias size. Finally, for the fifth experiment, we
used facial expressions to measure the bias when learning was
based on monetary rewards or losses.
Methods
Ethics statement
We recruited participants from the National Institutes of Health
and surrounding community. Written consent was obtained from
all participants following a protocol approved by the National
Institutes of Health Institutional Review Board.
Participants
No participants had any psychiatric or neurological disorder, as
verified by a staff physician. The five experiments derived from
three samples of participants. The first sample participated only in
Experiment 1. After one male participant was excluded due to
equipment error, the remaining 15 males and 6 females had an
average age of 28.3 years (range 22–49 years). The second sample
participated in Experiment 2 (5 males; 16 females; average age
24.8, range 22–30). Experiments 3, 4 and 5 consisted of data from
a third sample of 16 participants (8 males, average age 28.5, range
21–54). In this group, the ratings task (Experiment 4) was always
completed first to ensure all rated images were equally unfamiliar
to all the participants. Participants then underwent Experiments 3
and 5, with their order counterbalanced across participants.
Instrumental learning task
In each experiment, we implemented instrumental learning
tasks in several ‘‘conditions’’. Each condition was a separate run of
the experiment and consisted of four blocks of 26 choice trials. In
each block, two images were respectively associated with a 0.60
and a 0.40 chance of a $0.10 reward (although see loss blocks in
Experiment 5). Participants were instructed before each new block
that the images were assigned new probabilities and to make
decisions to maximize their money. Each image pair consisted of a
‘positive’ and a ‘negative’ image. The positive and negative images
were presented side-by-side on each trial, such that each appeared
on the right side of the screen for a pseudorandomly chosen 50%
of the trials in each block. Participants chose the right or left image
by keypress. When participants were rewarded, a screen appeared
stating ‘you win 10 cents!!’ and the current winnings. If there was
no reward given in the trial, a screen appeared stating ‘you lose.’
Two emotionally-valenced image pairs were presented in each
condition, one pair seen in the first and third blocks and the other
pair in the second and fourth blocks. For faces, the two image pairs
were always different identities. For the two blocks within a
condition that corresponded to a given image pair, the positive
image was more likely to be rewarded in one block, and the
negative image more likely to be rewarded in the other. The order
of probability assignments to the positive vs. the negative image
was randomized across subjects.
Data analysis
All analyses were carried out in MATLAB (The MathWorks,
Natick, MA). For the ideal observer model, we used a simplified
variant of the reinforcement learning model previously described
in detail [8,9,14]. For the analyses reported here, the simplified
model provides equivalent predictions. The model used in this
study prescribed the optimal choice between the two images
available on each trial, by selecting the image with the most
‘‘evidence’’, defined as the proportion of rewards resulting from
preceding choices of that image in the block. For example, if, on a
given trial, each face had been chosen twice, and the angry face
had won $0.10 both times (2 wins/2 choices = 100% evidence),
while the smiling face had won once and lost once (1 win/2
choices = 50% evidence), then the evidence would favor the angry
face. At the beginning of a block, the evidence for each image was
assigned a value of 0.50 (chance) until it was chosen, when its value
was then determined by the choice outcomes, as described above.
On some trials, participants agreed with the ideal observer model
and correctly chose the optimal image based on the evidence,
while on other trials, participants made choices that disagreed with
the evidence. The relationship between participants’ and model’s
choices (evidence-based), then, could be represented by a 262
contingency table, which tabulated each time a participant’s
choice agreed or disagreed with the evidence. In this table, if the
evidence favoring each image on a trial was equal, we tabulated a
0.5 for both possible model choices, denoting equal agreement for
both outcomes. For all conditions reported below, participants
agreed with the model more often than predicted by chance
(P,0.05, Bonferroni corrected). For cases when participants
disagreed with the model, we computed the conditional probabil-
ity that each participant would choose the positive image given
that the evidence in fact favored the negative image – ‘‘positivity
errors’’. Similarly, ‘‘negativity errors’’ are measured as the
conditional probability that each participant would choose the
negatively-valenced image given that the evidence favored the
positive image. When negativity errors are subtracted from
positivity errors, the resulting quantity measures the bias. That
is, it indicates how often participants irrationally ignored previous
evidence and chose the positive image, compared to how often
they irrationally chose the negative image.
All ANOVAs used at least the following two fixed effects factors.
The factor Error Type contrasted positivity and negativity errors
(the bias) while the factor Condition contrasted the different types
of image pairs considered in each experiment. The nature of the
conditions varied depending on the experiment. We were
particularly interested in the Error Type6Condition interaction,
which tests whether the difference between error types (i.e., the
bias) differs among the conditions. Further, we included
Participant as a nuisance factor and also Rewarded Stimulus,
which contrasted blocks where the positive image had a higher
probability of reward against blocks in which the negative image
had a higher probability of reward. In a separate analysis, we
performed additional ANOVAs, including a gender term for the
participants; there were no significant main effects or interactions
including gender. We employed similar ANOVAs to test post-hoc
whether pairs of conditions within an experiment differed in bias,
Emotional Biases and Facial Expressions
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while also controlling for nuisance variability in Rewarded
Stimulus and Participant. We report Bonferroni-corrected P-
values for these post-hoc F-tests. We lastly performed Bonferroni-
corrected t-tests to test if any condition’s bias differed from zero.
Results
Human and animal facial expressions bias decisions more
than foods
Smiling and angry expressions may respectively evoke positive
and negative emotional responses in participants and this
difference in emotional valence may be sufficient to bias decisions.
We therefore compared pictures of facial expressions with various
types of images that can evoke positive and negative emotional
responses and tested whether these valenced image pairs would
give rise to comparable-sized decision biases. We investigated
images of animals which were cute [23] or threatening and images
of food items, which were appetizing or repulsive (Fig. 1), taken
from the International Affective Picture System database (IAPS)
[24]. We compared these with smiling and angry facial expressions
using two female identities taken from the Karolinska Directed
Emotional Faces (KDEF) database [25]. The three conditions
were counterbalanced in a Latin square across participants. The
three conditions differed in the size of their bias (Fig. 2), as shown
by a significant Error Type6Condition interaction, F(2,332) =
3.55, P=0.0299. Planned comparisons showed that biases towards
the positive affective image were greater than zero for both faces,
t(83) = 4.75, P,0.05, and animals, t(83) = 5.13, P,0.05, but not
for food items, t(83) = 1.60, P.0.05. Animal images also showed a
larger bias than food items, t(83) = 2.55, P,0.05. The absence of
bias for food items suggests that not all forms of emotional valence
can bias decisions, but that some types of emotional information
may be more effective than others. Cute and threatening pictures
of animals, like facial expressions, may evoke emotions that
motivate social approach and avoidance [23], whereas appetizing
and disgusting food items do not. Our results, however, are also
possible if facial expressions more specifically bias decisions. The
animals in Experiment 1 not only have visible faces, but the
negative animal pictures (snake and dog) manifest obviously
threatening facial expressions. We will investigate animal pictures
without recognizable emotional expressions in Experiment 2.
Emotional images without facial expressions do not bias
decisions
In Experiment 2, we more extensively explored different types
of positive and negative image pairs. As in Experiment 1, we were
interested in determining whether emotional valence is sufficient
to bias decisions. We also investigated whether pairs of stimuli with
social relevance would give rise to larger decision biases, as this
might explain the bias to animal images observed in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2, we tested seven categories of non-face stimuli
(Fig. 1): animals, food items (as in Experiment 1), city scenes,
nature scenes, non-social words, social words, and weather scenes.
With the exception of the words, these stimuli were all drawn from
the IAPS database. Unlike Experiment 1, we chose animal image
pairs without recognizable facial expressions. The seven image
categories were presented as separate conditions, with order
counterbalanced in a Latin square across participants. The
variation in bias size among the category types (Fig. 2) was not
sufficient to yield a Category6Error Type interaction P.0.118.
Moreover, no category showed a bias significantly different from
zero. When differences in bias among all pairs of categories were
tested, we found no significant effects (P.0.107 corrected). Thus,
like Experiment 1, we found no evidence that emotional valence is
sufficient to bias decisions. Even positive and negative stimuli
which were socially-relevant failed to show bias, including words
that communicated social content. Even though positive and
negative animal pictures might motivate social approach and
avoidance, they bias decisions only when facial expressions are
present (Experiment 1). Experiment 3 uses facial stimuli to more
directly investigate the biasing capability of image pairs differing in
potential social approach and avoidance.
Facial trustworthiness and attractiveness do not bias
decisions
We tested whether social approach/avoidance information in
faces, other than emotional expressions, can bias decisions. We
chose human faces with neutral expressions that differed in either
perceived attractiveness or trustworthiness (Fig. 1) and tested
whether differences in these social attributes showed the same
influence on decision making as facial expressions. We used
previously published attractiveness and trustworthiness ratings of
pictures in the KDEF database [26] to choose faces based on the
largest difference in one characteristic (attractiveness or trustwor-
thiness) while holding the other one as constant as possible. There
were four blocks in Experiment 3. In blocks 1 and 3, the faces
viewed had similar trustworthiness ratings but differed in
attractiveness. In blocks 2 and 4, the faces had similar
attractiveness ratings but differed in trustworthiness. Neither faces
that differed in attractiveness nor those that differed in
trustworthiness showed any bias (Fig. 2), as there was no significant
Error Type6Condition interaction, nor were any post-hoc tests
significant (P.0.056). Thus, we have no evidence to claim that any
social attribute other than facial expressions can influence
instrumental learning.
Emotional valence does not correlate with the bias
One possibility that might explain the absence of results in
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 is that the image pairs chosen did not
evoke as strong or differentiated emotional responses in our
participants as facial expressions. If emotional valence generally
biases decisions, then facial expressions may appear to selectively
bias decisions because their emotional valence is more salient than
for other pictures. We tested in Experiment 4 whether the
difference in emotional valence between each image pair related to
the size of the bias. We presented to participants every picture
used throughout Experiments 1–3 and 5 in a pseudorandom order
and they made a self-paced rating of each on a scale from one to
five where 1= extremely negative; 2 = negative; 3 = neutral;
4 = positive; 5 = extremely positive. We subtracted the mean
rating for each negative image from that of the corresponding
positive image for each image pair used in the instrumental
learning task to derive differences in valence. We then correlated
the valence difference for each image pair in Experiments 1–3 and
5 with the corresponding bias. We found no significant correlation
(r=0.160, P=0.425)(Fig. 3). Non-face stimulus pairs (grey circles)
were nearly all rated with equivalent or higher valence than the
face expression pairs (black crosses), yet the biases associated with
non-face image pairs were distributed around zero. This provides
further evidence that emotional valence in general is not sufficient
to induce instrumental learning biases.
Decisions are biased for either rewarding or punishing
outcomes
Experiments 1–4 suggest that the bias was mediated by a
mechanism for which face expressions are the most effective inputs
of those that we examined. We also investigated the outputs of this
Emotional Biases and Facial Expressions
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Figure 1. Emotionally-valenced image pairs used as stimuli in Experiments 1–3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033461.g001
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mechanism by exploring the types of instrumental learning that
can be affected by facial expressions. Specifically, we tested
whether the facial expression bias was specific for learning from
monetary reward, or whether the bias was present when
participants learned from punishment as well. We compared the
size of the bias in conditions where the images differed in potential
monetary wins (a replication of Experiment 1) versus potential
monetary losses. The face pairs used were identical to those used
in the faces condition of Experiment 1 (Fig. 1). Participants began
Experiment 5 with a pot of $6.00, and then underwent
counterbalanced win and loss conditions (four blocks in each).
The running balance for the total of eight blocks was recorded
continuously. In the win blocks, the task was identical to
Experiment 1. In the ‘loss’ blocks, one image had a 60% chance
of loss, while the other had a 40% chance of loss. Participants were
again instructed to attempt to maximize their money. If the
participant lost money, a screen would appear stating ‘you lose 10
cents!’ and displaying the current monetary sum. Otherwise, a
screen would appear stating ‘no loss!’ Although the bias in the wins
condition was numerically larger than that of the losses condition
(Fig. 2), the Error Type6Condition interaction did not reach
significance, F(1, 225) = 3.57, P=0.21. Moreover, decisions were
significantly biased for both win t(63) = 5.55, P,0.05 and loss
t(63) = 3.21, P,0.05 conditions. Thus, we have insufficient
evidence to conclude that the expression bias is selective for
reward-related decisions versus punishment-related decisions.
Discussion
We investigated the specificity of emotional/social biases on
instrumental learning. We replicated the finding that participants’
reward-related decisions favored smiling over angry expressions,
when these choices were not supported by evidence from previous
choices. This bias occurred only for expressions and not for the
other types of emotionally-valenced image pairs that we
investigated, even when they were socially-relevant. In sum, the
biasing influence of emotions on decision-making is restricted and
facial expressions appear to have a special importance.
We were interested in whether the bias previously observed for
facial expressions [8,9,14] also related more generally to social
relevance or emotional valence. We therefore examined a variety
of emotionally-valenced image pairs that had social or non-social
content but none produced biases nor did the perceived emotional
valence of the pairs relate to the bias size. Indeed, facial
expressions, which showed a bias, were rated as less valenced
than most non-face stimuli, which did not show any bias. We
found that animal pictures, which might induce social approach or
aversion in our participants [23], gave rise to a bias only when
threatening facial expressions and ‘inviting’ faces were visible. We
also tested words expressing social content comparable to that of
facial expressions (‘‘happy’’, ‘‘angry’’) but these did not bias
decision making either. Lastly, faces differing in social attributes
including attractiveness or trustworthiness did not give rise to any
bias. Thus we may eliminate emotional valence and general social-
relevance as sufficient to bring about a bias on decision making.
We did not directly observe the brain mechanisms mediating
these biasing influences on instrumental learning. Nevertheless,
our behavioral methods allow us to re-evaluate existing findings
showing that neural mechanisms contributing to social approach/
avoidance may mediate the bias. Particularly, the facial expression
bias is associated with mentalizing networks, responsible for
inferring the thoughts and intentions of others [9] and also
oxytocin, an agent known to promote prosocial behavior [14].
Our results qualify these findings, as the biasing influences of these
neural mechanisms may not be deployed by social information
generally, but instead by a more restricted class of stimuli,
including facial expressions.
Although we can clearly claim that the bias is highly selective to
some visual stimuli, conclusive claims about selectivity are
notoriously complicated by the fact that all stimuli cannot possibly
be compared. Nevertheless, the selective findings we show here
suggest several new lines of research which can further test which
stimuli induce biases and which do not. First, we examined only two
social dimensions of the face: attractiveness and trustworthiness.
These social dimensions and many others might be investigated
more thoroughly by more systematically manipulating the amount
Figure 2. Mean and standard errors across participants of the biases for each condition in Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033461.g002
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of information related to these dimensions in the stimuli. Indeed,
artificial facial stimuli can be constructed and tested, which can span
the face-space of social dimensions [26]. Second, arousal [27] is also
an important dimension in emotion processing not yet investigated.
It is possible that stimuli known to be highly arousing, such as
erotica, violent animal or human attacks and mutilation, might also
lead to decision-making biases via their activation of appetitive and
defensive motivational systems [28]. Furthermore, although food-
related stimuli did not produce a bias in our study, the arousal
produced by these stimuli might be heightened and the bias thereby
affected using the physiological and mental states (hunger, thirst) of
participants, as well as their personal preferences (e.g. dietary). A
third important possibility is that expressions produced a bias
because they are bodily actions. Indeed, the general class of
emotional bodily actions, including non-face actions, may induce
biases. There is a considerable literature examining bodily
expressions of emotion [28–30]. These stimuli, as well as those
depicting acts of violence or erotica (such as those in the IAPS
stimulus set) might also predict biases, if the general category of
emotional bodily actions is sufficient to bias decisions.
Our results also have practical applications for understanding
how people respond to persuasive information. Numerous social
contexts, including commercial advertising, routinely employ
images of expressive faces as well as many of the types of
emotional information that we investigated here. These presenta-
tions are intended to convince others that a decision (such as the
one advertised) will lead to a rewarding outcome or will cause an
adverse outcome to be avoided. Our results provide evidence that
emotional expressions are indeed effective influences on actions
and expectations of rewards. While attractive faces, descriptive
language (social or nonsocial words) or stirring or appetizing
images might attract attention and induce potent emotional or
appetitive responses, our data suggest this content may be less
effective in altering choices. Moreover, facial expressions led
participants to ignore evidence about potential monetary gains
and, to some extent, behave irrationally. As irrational actions may
be undesirable, it is important to examine more closely the factors
that can attenuate emotional biases so that people can make more
reasonable and rewarding decisions.
In conclusion, emotional information gave rise to irrational
decisions, where participants expected monetary rewards following
smiling expressions compared to angry expressions, when past
evidence did not support this expectation. Across a surprisingly
wide variety of social and otherwise emotional stimuli, only facial
expressions (human and animal) gave rise to this decision-making
bias. Actions of other people and animals which convey emotion
may exert a special influence on how people make decisions.
These results, and the study of emotional deviations from rational
decision-making in general, are important for understanding how
emotions can influence our actions and choices.
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